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| Case Name | Date | Docket Number | Issue |
|---|---|---|---|
| State v. Ludwig | December 26, 2002 | 02-0646-CR | Voir dire - D appealed a judgment convicting him of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, a judgment convicting him of causing injury by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and an order denying his postconviction motions. D claimed the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it denied his request to individually voirdire prospective jurors regarding a newspaper editorial about the case. The court was satisfied that the trial court acted within its discretion and therefore affirmed the judgment. |
| State v. Riedel | December 26, 2002 | 02-1772-CR | Supression of evidence - D appealed from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated by arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence resulting from the analysis of his blood sample drawn without his consent following his arrest. D argued that the police were required to obtain a search warrant before submitting his blood sample for testing. The court rejected D's argument and affirmed the judgment. |
| State v. Polacheck | December 26, 2002 | 02-1576-CR | Reasonable suspicion - D appealed from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and an order denying a pretrial motion. D argued that the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him. The officer observed a car traveling southbound on a frontage road abutting Interstate 94 in Racine county; this car was traveling approximately twenty-five to thirty miles per hour in a fifty-five miles per hour zone and there were three other cars behind it, unable to pass. The officer also noticed the car drive on the fog line for approximately fifty feet and leave the lane of traffic. In addition, the car had its left turn signal on but failed to turn left. Then a traffic stop was conducted. Upon approaching the D, the officer noticed an odor of intoxicants. D failed the field sobriety tests administered and was arrested for OWI. The court disagreed with D and affirmed the judgment and order. |
| Village of Fontana v. Zais | December 26, 2002 | 02-1625 | Probable Cause - D appealed from her conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated on grounds that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence. WI Stat. §343.303 allows officers to use the results of a preliminary breath test to help determine probable cause to arrest provided that the officer first "requests" that such a test be conducted. The court agreed with D that because no request was made, any review of probable cause must be made without reference to the PBT results. However, the court also determined that, even without the PBT, there was ample evidence of probable cause to arrest. Therefore the court affirmed the decision. |
| State v. Hyland | December 19, 2002 | 02-1237-CR | Sixth Amendment - D appealed the judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle (OWI) while under the influence of an intoxicant and contended the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the charge on the ground that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated. D moved for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the delay in excess of one year violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Although the analysis differs somewhat from that of the trial court, the court concluded that D's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated, and affirmed the decision. |
| State v. Derks | December 19, 2002 | 02-1585-CR | Probable Cause - D appealed the judgment of conviction for operating while intoxicated by contending the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence on the ground that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest him. A Deputy Sheriff saw D driving a car on U.S. Highway 10 and stopped him for speeding. D spoke with slurred speech, had an odor of intoxicants on his breath, and his eyes were extremely bloodshot and glazed. D admitted he had been drinking beer and there were open intoxicants in his car. The court concluded there was probable cause and affirmed the decision of the trial court. |
| County of Walworth v. Wolf | December 18, 2002 | 02-1476 | Reasonable suspicion - D appealed from judgments of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC). D argued that the investigating officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. The officer was on routine patrol when he observed a "suspicious" vehicle parked in a gravel parking lot on private property with its headlamps illuminated. The property is used for the commercial sale of food items at seasonal times of the year. At the time of this encounter, the business was closed for the season. The officer believed the vehicle to be suspicious because it was parked on private property of a closed business during the early morning hours of darkness. The Court rejected D's argument and affirmed the judgments. |
| State v. Disch | December 12, 2002 | 02-1544 | Reasonable suspicion - D appealed an order of the circuit court revoking her driver's license for failure to submit to a test for intoxication. D argued that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. The court disagreed and affirmed the order of the circuit court. |
| County of Walworth v. Aarud | December 11, 2002 | 02-1483 | Reasonable suspicion, probable cause - D appealed from a judgment of conviction for driving while intoxicated. D argued that he was seized without reasonable suspicion or probable cause when he was asked to take a preliminary breath test (PBT) and to perform field sobriety tests. The court disagreed and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
| City of Mequon v. Peacock | December 11, 2002 | 02-1574 | Anonymous tip, reasonable suspicion - The appeal required the court to address whether a totally anonymous tip provides sufficient justification for an investigative traffic stop. The tip contained an assertion of criminal activity-a possible intoxicated driver traveling along a main thoroughfare-and nothing more. It lacked any verifiable information that could lead to the identification of the tipster or would permit the testing of the informant's basis of knowledge or credibility. Accordingly, the court reversed the order denying D's motion to suppress and the judgment of conviction. |
| State v. Maas | December 11, 2002 | 02-0258 | Reasonable suspicion - D appealed from a judgment convicting him upon a guilty plea of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated by arguing that the trial court erroneously denied D's motion to suppress evidence and dismiss. D sought relief on the ground that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. The court concluded that the trial court properly denied the motion and affirmed the judgment of conviction. |
| Village of Elm Grove v. Fleming | December 11, 2002 | 02-0960 | Reasonable suspicion, probable cause - D appealed from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OWI). D argued that the trial court erroneously denied her motion to suppress evidence because there was no probable cause to give her a preliminary breath test (PBT) and therefore no probable cause for her arrest. The court disagreed and affirmed the judgment. |
| State v. Tuomi | December 10, 2002 | 02-1891 | Motion to supress - D appealed an order denying suppression of evidence obtained during a traffic stop. He also appealed the conviction for operating with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration. D argued that an anonymous tip reporting he had backed into another vehicle and fled the scene did not provide police with reasonable suspicion to stop him. Because the court agreed that the tip did not provide the police with reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop, the court reversed the order denying the suppression motion and the judgment of conviction. |
| State v. Pfaff | December 4, 2002 | 02-1702 | Refusal hearing - This was a review of a refusal hearing. The OWI arrest came on the heels of an accident where a driver in another car was killed. The defendant in this case was also arrested for a felony-homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. D had a preliminary hearing on the felony and was bound over by a court commissioner. At the refusal hearing, the trial court sua sponte, and over objection, incorporated the transcript from the preliminary hearing as part of the refusal hearing record and indicated that it would use the transcript in helping the court to decide whether there was probable cause to arrest for OWI, one of the elements in a refusal hearing. The court also instructed D that the officers were present in the courtroom and could be cross-examined. On appeal, D argued that the procedure used by the trial court robbed him of the right to have a tribunal that observes the demeanor of the witnesses in assessing credibility during the State's direct evidence. The court agreed with the premise. Moreover, the court's decision relieved the State of having to put on witnesses and meet its burden of proof. The court reversed and remanded with directions to reconduct the probable cause portion of the refusal hearing. However, the court further found that the trial court's finding of unreasonable refusal is not clearly erroneous and affirmed on that issue. |
| State v. Severson | November 27, 2002 | 02-1362-CR | Judgment of conviction - D appealed a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Because the court concluded that there was nothing in the arguments presented in the appeal that bears on the circuit court's judgment of conviction for a violation of Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a), the court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. |
| State v. Boedecker | November 27, 2002 | 02-1364-CR | Constitutionality - D appealed the order revoking her operator's license for one year under Wis. Stat. §343.305(10) (1999-2000) on the ground that she refused to submit to a chemical test of her breath following her arrest for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The only issue D raised on appeal is whether the implied consent statute, §343.305, is unconstitutional. D contended it is because it forces an individual to choose between abandoning his or her Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and suffering the sanction of lost driving privileges. The court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. |
| County of Iowa v. Klinger | November 27, 2002 | 02-0737 | Supression, constitutionality - D appealed the judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated by contending the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the result of the analysis of his blood. D argued that he did not validly and voluntarily consent to the taking of a sample of his blood. D argued that the implied consent statute is unconstitutional because it forces an individual to choose between abandoning his or her Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and suffering the sanction of lost driving privileges. The court affirmed the decision of the trial court. |
| State v. Eggimann | November 21, 2002 | 02-0758 | Implied consent - D appealed order revoking driver's license by arguing that Wisconsin's implied consent law, Wis. Stat. §343.305, violates the Fourth Amendment right to refuse consent to searches and seizures by imposing punishment for his refusal to submit to a chemical test for intoxication. Because the court concluded that any pressure employed by the statute to obtain consent is reasonable and does not violate Fourth Amendment protections, the court affirmed the circuit court's order. |
| State v. Dolan | November 21, 2002 | 02-1260 | Refusal - D appealed an order which revoked motor vehicle operating privilege on account of refusal to submit to chemical testing for alcohol concentration pursuant to Wis. Stat. §343.305. D claimed the revocation order must be set aside because the imposition of statutory penalties for refusing to submit to chemical testing is a "facial violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." The court disagreed and affirmed. |
| State v. Helper | November 21, 2002 | 02-1364-CR | Motion to supress - D appealed from a conviction for OMVWI contending the circuit court erred in denying her motions to suppress evidence. She argued that Wisconsin's Implied Consent Law, Wis. Stat. §343.305, coerces consent to search and violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. D also argued that the police may not analyze a blood sample seized from an intoxicated driver without obtaining a warrant. The court affirmed the decision of the circuit court. |
| State v. Rose | November 21, 2002 | 02-0700-CR | Motion to supress - D appealed conviction for OMVW contending that the circuit court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence. D argued that Wisconsin's Implied Consent Law, Wis. Stat. §343.305, violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and that the police may not analyze a blood sample seized from an intoxicated driver without obtaining a warrant. The Court disagreed and affirmed the decision of the circuit court. |
| Columbia County v. Linde-Ray | November 14, 2002 | 02-0535 | Motion to supress - D appealed a judgment of the circuit court convicting her of operating while intoxicated by arguing that the trial court improperly denied her motions to suppress. Her first motion alleged that the evidence obtained from a blood draw was unreasonably obtained because a less intrusive means was available. The second motion alleged that the evidence from the blood draw should be suppressed because exigent circumstances did not exist. D conceded that the issues are controlled b y State v. Thorstad and State v. VanLaarhoven, respectively. Therefore, the court affirmed on both issues. |
| State v. Montoto | November 12, 2002 | 02-1619-CR | Evidentiary Foundation- D appealed from a conviction finding him guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration, arguing that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it allowed into evidence the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test result. D contended that because he refused to consent to a breath test, the result of the BAC test was not automatically admissible and should have been excluded on the basis that the State failed to lay a proper foundation for its admission. D also argued that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in instructing the jury. Because D did not raise a timely objection on the first issue and because the jury instructions were not erroneous, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. |
| State v. Caspersen | November 7, 2002 | 02-0357-CR | Elements instruction- D appealed conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and an order denying postconviction relief. D claims his conviction must be set aside because he was convicted of a crime "which does not exist," in that the jury found him guilty after receiving an instruction which erroneously defined the term "under the influence of an intoxicant." The court concluded that D forfeited the right to claim error in the OMVWI elements instruction because he did not object to the instruction at the instructions conference. The court affirmed the appealed judgment and order. |
| State v. Kueht | November 7, 2002 | 02-1002-CR | Motion to suppress, Reasonable suspicion- D appealed from a conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. D contended that motion to suppress evidence should have been granted because the officer who arrested him did not personally have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. A tip was delivered to the police, the officer did not observe erratic driving, stopped the vehicle and arrested the driver after D failed field sobriety tests. The court affirmed the decision of the trial court. |
| State v. Wintlend | November 6, 2002 | 02-0965-CR | Coercive Measure, Right to Travel- D appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in contending that when he was read the Informing the Accused form by the officer following his arrest, the language of that form contained a threatened sanction of a loss of driving privileges unless he consented to taking a blood alcohol test. D maintained that this threat constituted a coercive measure invalidating his consent for Fourth Amendment purposes. While there is a constitutional right to travel, there is no constitutional right to operate a motor vehicle. Second, the United States Supreme Court has never interpreted the Fourth Amendment as imposing an absolute prohibition of state measures calling upon individuals to abandon their rights as a prerequisite to the receipt of governmental benefits and privileges. The court observed that long after the motorist obtains his or her license, the motorist still has choices. If the motorist makes the choice to drive, but is stopped and arrested, the motorist's plethora of choices is whittled down to one self-induced Hobson's choice-take the test or lose the license to drive. It is the motorist who has voluntarily asserted his or her autonomy, which freedom of choice has put the motorist, as Justice Sutherland put it, "between the rock and the whirlpool." The court rejected D's argument. |
| State v. Naydihor | Oct. 30, 2002 | 01-3093-CR 01-3094-CR | Resentencing- D appealed from conviction for causing great bodily harm by the intoxicated use of a motor vehicle, felony bail jumping and from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. D's appeal stems from resentencing, which was necessitated by improper remarks by the prosecutor in violation of the plea agreement at the original sentencing. The resentencing produced an increased sentence. On appeal, D argued that his trial counsel was ineffective at the resentencing for failing to object to certain remarks by the prosecutor which D contends once again breached the plea agreement. The court found that the prosecutor did not violate the terms of the plea and the court affirmed the judgment and order. |
| State v. Lewis | October 29, 2002 | 02-0094 | Probable Cause- D appealed from a revocation of his driver's license and claimed that there was not probable cause for his arrest and that his refusal to submit to a field sobriety test was reasonable. An officer observed D come to a complete stop in the roadway and get struck by another vehicle; observed D exit his vehicle and walk right past the Officer who was calling for him to stop; after stopping and during an interview the officer noticed an odor of intoxicants and unsteady feet. D was requested to perform field sobriety tests and refused. The court found probable cause and a subsequent reasonable need for field sobriety tests. The court affirmed the order of the trial court. |
| State v. Sanger | Oct. 23, 2002 | 02-1533-CR | Motion to supress- State appealed from a trial court order granting D's motion to suppress evidence based on a lack of probable cause to arrest for operating while intoxicated. Noting that the case was "close," the trial court found that while the arresting officer had probable cause to believe D was intoxicated, he did not have probable cause to believe that D had driven or operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The State successfully contended that the trial court erred in granting D's motion to suppress because the totality of the circumstances supported a finding of probable cause to arrest. |
| Vernon County v. Wolfgram | Oct. 17, 2002 | 01-2915 | Reasonable Suspicion- D appealed judgment convicting him of OMVWI and of operating with a PAC on the basis that arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion and the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. At the suppression hearing, the officer articulated facts that demonstrated suspicious behavior sufficient to justify an investigative stop of the truck: (1)observed an abandoned, overturned vehicle that had a number of factual connections to D; (2)knew that a possibly intoxicated man had left the overturned vehicle earlier that evening; and (3)observed a truck of the same make and color as D's truck approach and then rapidly accelerate past the accident scene. Decision of the trial court affirmed. |
| State v. Ligon | Oct. 16, 2002 | 02-0611 | Constitutional Refusal - D appealed an order revoking motor vehicle operating privileges after the circuit court concluded he had no basis to refuse to consent to a chemical test of his blood alcohol content. D challenged the constitutionality of the implied consent law, arguing that refusal to submit to testing punishes him for exercising his Fourth Amendment right. Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law we review de novo. The State did not punish D for exercising a constitutional right. Any punishment suffered arose because D revoked his consent to be tested. The court determined that the statute did not punish D for exercising his constitutional rights and, therefore, affirmed the trial court's order. |
| State v. Patterson | Oct. 15, 2002 | 02-1174-CR | Prosecutorial Misconduct - D appealed from the conviction for OAR and the order denying motions for post-conviction relief. D argued that "the prosecutor's violation of the trial court's evidentiary rulings and his final argument dealing with suspected drug activity . constitute plain error," and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. The court concluded that the prosecutor's violations of the trial court's evidentiary ruling constituted "plain error" and that, on appeal, the State has failed to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial. |
| State v. Stella | Oct. 15, 2002 | 02-1196-CR | Reasonable Suspicion - D appealed conviction of OWI and the order denying motion to suppress. The court was satisfied that the trial court correctly determined that the State had met its burden of proof that the stop was reasonable, as the officer who stopped D's car did so after witnessing D violate several traffic laws, the court affirmed. |
| State v. Gallion | Oct. 10, 2002 | 01-0051-CR | Sentencing - D appealed judgment convicting him of homicide by use of a motor vehicle with a PAC in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(b) (1997-98). D entered a guilty plea and was sentenced under truth-in-sentencing. D asserted the sentencing court committed three errors: (1) the court violated rights to procedural due process and equal protection of the law; (2) the court considered two improper factors; and (3) the court imposed a sentence that is "too harsh." After considering all of the circumstances, the court affirmed the sentence imposed because it was not "`so excessive and unusual and so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.'" The court affirmed on all issues. |
| La Crosse County v. Watters | Oct. 3, 2002 | 02-0358 | Supression of Evidence - D moved to suppress the results of blood test. Circuit court denied request and D was tried on stipulated facts contained in the Record. Circuit court found D guilty of OMVWI. The arguments that D presented in appeal could not result in a reversal of his judgment of conviction for OMVWI, even if the court were to accept his views as accurate statements of the law. The decision was affirmed. |
| County of Sheboygan v. Jacobsen | Oct. 2, 2002 | 02-0485 | Supression of Evidence - D was charged with OWI, contrary to Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a) and PAC contrary to §346.63(1)(b). D filed pretrial motions seeking to suppress the results of the blood analysis on several different theories. The circuit court denied all of the motions and D entered, by stipulation, a no contest plea to the OWI charge. After D filed his notice of appeal, the court entered an order requesting the parties to address the issue of whether the no contest plea to a civil forfeiture constituted a waiver of D's right to appeal. The court concluded that the right was waived and dismissed D's appeal. |
| State v. Coppock | Oct. 1, 2002 | 02-0528-CR | Supression of Evidence - D appealed from judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, following his guilty plea. D argued that the trial court erred in denying his "Motion to Suppress Statements and Evidence due to Unlawful Seizure, Detention and Arrest." Here, contrary to D's contention, the trial court made a credibility call. While it did so in a somewhat tentative fashion, and with respectful consideration for what it seemed to view as the apparent honesty of an uninterested witness, the trial court found the officer's account "more reasonable" in light of all the evidence. The court did not deem the witness incredible; rather it found the witness's account less reasonable than the officer's. The court affirmed. |
| State v. Baratka | Oct. 1, 2002 | 02-0770 | Refusal of Chemical Test - D appealed from an order revoking his driver's license because he unlawfully refused to submit to a chemical test, in violation of WIS. STAT. §343.305(9). D presented two arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court erred by determining that the State's failure to respond to requests for admission was excusable neglect; and (2) D was not properly informed of his rights regarding the chemical testing, and he did not refuse this testing. D was stopped by an officer for alleged traffic violations. The officer noticed physical traits and behavior indicating that D might be under the influence of an intoxicant. When the officer asked D to perform field sobriety tests, D produced an "assertion of rights" card and asked for a lawyer. After D continued to assert his right to decline the field tests, he was placed under arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of WIS. STAT. §346.63(1)(a). Repeated requests for an attorney can amount to a refusal as long as the officer informs the driver that there is no right to an attorney at that point. The officer did so inform D. The court therefore concluded that the evidence supports the trial court's finding that D refused chemical testing, and the order revoking D's operating privileges. |
| State v. Azevedo | Sept. 26, 2002 | 01-3348-CR | Probable Cause, Suppression of Evidence - The State appealed an order which granted D's motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to request a preliminary breath screening test (PBT) under Wis. Stat. §343.303. The court concluded that, even if the results of two field sobriety tests which D challenged as unreliable are disregarded, the officer had observed sufficient indicators that D was intoxicated to meet the standard established in County of Jefferson v. Renz for requesting a PBT. Accordingly, the court reversed the appealed order and remanded for further proceedings. |
| State v. Clark | Sept. 24, 2002 | 02-1123 | Refusal of Chemical Test - D appealed from an order revoking his privilege to drive after the trial court found unreasonable D's refusal to submit to the chemical testing. Clark admitted during his testimony that he refused to submit to a chemical testing of his blood-alcohol level. D claimed that the officer confused him about his rights and responsibilities under the implied-consent law. D contended on this appeal that the arresting officer's colloquy with him in the field made D believe that he had nothing to lose by refusing to take the blood-alcohol-level test. The requirement that drivers in Wisconsin submit to a test of their blood-alcohol level when suspected of driving while impaired was, of course, designed to "combat drunk driving." State v. Reitter. Thus, the law must be construed "liberally" to effectuate that purpose. Order affirmed by the court. |
| State v. Hovind | Sept. 19, 2002 | 02-0137-CR | Denial of Opening Default Judgment - D appealed judgment of OMVWI and contended the court erred by including his prior in C.A. as a prior conviction for purposes of penalty enhancement. D contended that the court should not have included his C.A. conviction because C.A.'s OWI statute is not "substantially similar" to Wisconsin's OWI statute. Wis. Stat. §343.307(1)(d) requires that the other state have a statute prohibiting operating a vehicle while impaired. "Substantially similar" emphasizes that the out-of-state statute need only prohibit conduct similar to the list of prohibited conduct in §343.307(1)(d). Judgment of the circuit affirmed by the Court. |
| La Crosse County v. Breidel | Sept. 19, 2002 | 02-1118-FT | Motion to Suppress - D appealed the denial to suppress evidence of intoxication that D asserts was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. D exited his vehicle, entered his home and was later arrested. Because the court concluded that D's rights were not violated, the circuit court was affirmed. |
| State v. Christopher | Sept. 18, 2002 | 01-2524-CR | Motion to Suppress - D appealed from a judgment of conviction of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration because the police officer lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle and that his sentence, which required both vehicle forfeiture and an ignition interlock, was not statutorily authorized. The court affirmed the circuit court's denial of the motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the stop but reverse the sentence and remand to the circuit court for imposition of a sentence which requires either an ignition interlock or forfeiture of the vehicle, but not both. |
| State v. Bruley | Sept. 18, 2002 | 02-1113-CR | Terry - D appealed from conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and operating a motor vehicle after revocation challenging the trial court's denial of motion to suppress based on the claim that the arresting officer's initial detention was an invalid Terry stop. Officer got out of his vehicle and told D to stop so he could speak with D. D failed to heed the officer's request and instead "made a quick movement or a quick jogging-type motion to get across North Main Street where [the officer] finally was able to stop and have contact with him." The ensuing encounter and further investigation revealed that D was intoxicated and he was arrested. The court upheld the trial court's ruling and affirmed the judgment of conviction. |
| State v. Hanson | Sept. 17, 2002 | 02-0045-CR | Withdrawl of Plea - D appealed conviction of offense driving with a prohibited blood alcohol content (BAC). D argued that the trial court should have allowed him to withdraw his no contest plea before sentencing to allow him an opportunity to present a necessity defense. The court concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied the motion, the court affirmed the judgment and order. |
| State v. Hubbard | Sept. 11, 2002 | 01-3391-CR | Probable Cause - D appealed from the judgment of conviction of operating while intoxicated. D was found within walking distance of his abandoned car. All of the facts allowed a reasonable person to infer that it was probable that D had driven the car while intoxicated. The court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. |
| Marathon County v. Hart | Sept. 10, 2002 |
02-0906 02-0907 | Denial of Opening Default Judgment - D appealed orders denying motion to reconsider the trial court's discretion because D's failure to be present at a pretrial conference was due to mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect, and good cause. The court affirmed the orders of the trial court. |
| State v. Coon | Sept. 10, 2002 | 02-0869-CR | Probable Cause - D appealed from a judgment convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence and an order denying his motion to suppress the blood test results. D inexplicably slid off the roadway, injuring himself. EMTs arrived and one of the EMTs informed officers that D had been drinking and was the sole operator of the motorcycle. Officers could smell the odor of alcohol coming from the area where D was. No field sobriety tests were performed. At the hospital and after detecting an odor of alcohol on D, he was placed under arrest for OWI and medical personnel tested D's blood. The judgment and order was affirmed. |
| City of Fond du Lac v. Compton | Sept. 4, 2002 | 02-1254-FT | Authorized to Draw Blood - D asserted that an individual performing a blood test was not one of the persons authorized to draw blood pursuant to Wis. Stat. §343.305(5)(b). Difference in title was irrelevant since the individual had twenty-two years of experience and her job was to draw blood. A job title different than occupation is completely immaterial. |
| State v. Seth | Sept. 4, 2002 | 02-0863-CR | Constitutional Challenge - D contended that Wisconsin's definition of a "prohibited alcohol concentration" that decreases after the second offense and again after the third offense is constitutionally infirm. D entered a guilty plea to operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration and waived any challenge. The court affirmed conviction for fourth offense drunk driving. |
| City of Whitewater v. Michor | Sept. 4, 2002 | 01-3312 | Reasonable Suspicion - D was weaving in his own lane of traffic and on one occasion he drove on top of the center line. Whether the observed conduct is lawful is not determinative of whether reasonable suspicion exists to make a traffic stop. A reasonable police officer could decide that D's behavior was erratic and that he was not driving with appropriate control. The stop was reasonable and the court affirmed the decision. |
| State v. Smart | August 27, 2002 | 02-0469-CR | Due Process - D contended Wisconsin's drunk driving sentencing scheme, by allowing each judicial district to establish presumptive guidelines, violates due process and equal protection because it allows for different sentences of similarly situated offenders based solely on the jurisdiction where they were convicted. Neither the sentencing guidelines nor the court's application of them violated D's due process or equal protection rights. Therefore, the court affirmed the circuit court's judgment and order. |
| State v. Anderson | August 27, 2002 | 02-0956-CR | Probable Cause - Officer was dispatched to a two-motorcycle accident, saw marks on the roadway leading to D and his motorcycle, a strong odor of intoxicants on D's breath, bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. The court concluded that the officer had probable cause and affirmed the order denying the suppression motion and the conviction was also affirmed. |
| State v. Naff | August 22, 2002 | 02-0782-CR | Probable Cause - D argued that the results of his Preliminary Breath Test could not be considered in the arresting officer's probable cause determination because D did not consent to the test, and that without such results there was no probable cause to arrest. D claimed the trial court erred by refusing to allow into evidence excerpts from a State manual entitled "Basic Training Program for Breath Examiner Specialist." Finally, D argued that the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury on the effect of the blood alcohol curve. The court concluded that: (1)there was probable cause to arrest even absent the PBT; (2)the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it excluded the excerpts from the State manual; and (3)refusal to give the proposed jury instruction was a proper exercise of discretion because the evidence did not support the instruction. |
| County of Green Lake v. Lindemann | August 21, 2002 | 02-0080 | Misinformation for BAC test - In County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 280, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995), a three-part test was formulated for use when an allegedly intoxicated driver claims they refused to take a test to measure blood alcohol content because of misinformation given by a law enforcement officer. In this case the court decided that D was given an oversupply of information that was misleading, but that the misleading information did not lead him to refuse to submit to a blood test. The court affirmed. |
| Winnebago County v. Lisiecki | August 21, 2002 |
02-0037 02-0038 | OAS Competent Proof - D appealed from a judgment convicting him of OWI and OAS. D argued that there was insufficient evidence for either of the convictions. The County failed to discharge its burden of proving the elements of the violation for which D was charged. The record was devoid of "competent proof" to show that D's license was suspended on the date he was operating his motor vehicle. The evidence did not support D's OAS conviction; it did support his conviction for OWI. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. |
| County of Dunn v. Uetz | August 20, 2002 | 02-0937 | Reasonable Suspicion, Probable Cause - D appealed from a conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and contended that the arresting officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to make the initial investigatory stop. Alternatively, D contended that even if the initial stop was permissible, the officer lacked probable cause to administer the preliminary breath test and therefore lacked probable cause to arrest him. The court rejected both contentions and affirmed the judgment. |
| State v. Neumeyer | August 15, 2002 | 02-0287-CR | Reasonable Suspicion - D claimed the circuit court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a police officer's stop of his vehicle. Because the court concluded that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that D had violated the law and that the frisk and brief transport of D while temporarily handcuffed did not constitute an arrest, the court affirmed the circuit court's order denying the motions to suppress and the judgment of conviction. |
| City of Muskego v. Dyer | August 14, 2002 | 01-3052 | Jurors Subjective Bias - D appealed from a judgment of conviction for OWI because he contended two of the potential jurors should have been struck for cause. During voir dire, one potential juror indicated that he did not think it was possible to be a responsible driver after drinking even one drink and admitted that his own drunk driving conviction from a year earlier was still "pretty tough" for him because he had almost lost his eyesight. Another juror stated that someone cannot be a good, responsible driver after one drink, that she does not ever drink alcohol because of this belief and that even if she did drink, she would never drive afterwards. The central issue in the case was not whether D was a responsible driver after one drink, but whether D was guilty of OWI. The court disagreed with D and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. |
| County of Dane v. Sporle | August 1, 2002 | 01-2715 | Motion to Supress - D claimed the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence of the results of two post-arrest tests for alcohol concentration when the arresting officer failed to comply with the Implied Consent Law because the officer did not clarify whether he had requested a blood test as the agency's "alternate test" under Wis. Stat. §343.305(5)(a), or was seeking a test from a "qualified person of his . own choosing" at "his . own expense," as also authorized by that paragraph. The court concluded that the authority D cites creates no "duty to clarify" that was breached by the arresting officer in this case. The Court also concluded that the officer fulfilled his obligation to "inform the accused," and did nothing to frustrate a request on D's part to obtain a third test at his own expense. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of conviction. |
| State v. Phillips | July 31, 2002 | 01-3439 | tERRY - The State argued that when an officer saw a car door fly open while an automobile was making a left turn and then saw the passenger close the door, that circumstance justified the officer in stopping the vehicle on suspicion that someone in the car might have been trying to get out. The court ruled that the mere opening of a passenger-side door and the closing of it by a passenger, without more, cannot form the basis for a stop based on reasonable suspicion that a crime is being committed. Neither Terry nor Waldner stands for the proposition that even based on one innocent detail, an experienced officer can deduce that criminal activity might be afoot. Both cases stand for the proposition that it was a convergence of several facts which allowed the officers to deduce certain logical conclusions. |
| State v. Arbuckle | July 31, 2002 | 02-0032 | Misinformation for BAC test - In County of Ozaukee v. Quelle the court formulated a three-part test to use when an allegedly intoxicated driver claims that he or she reasonably refused to take a test to measure alcohol because of misinformation given by a law enforcement officer. Here, the court decided that D was given an oversupply of information that was incorrect, but that the incorrect information did not lead him to refuse to take the test. The court affirmed. |
| State v. Decorah | July 30, 2002 | 02-0832-CR | Totality of Circumstances - The totality of what the officer observed permitted him to reasonably infer that the driver was somehow impaired, and he had a right to temporarily detain D for the purpose of inquiry. Three instances of unusual driving-weaving and then crossing the fog line twice were observed. The court concluded that the trial court erred when it dismissed the charges against D. Because there were reasonable grounds for the officer to stop D, the judgment was reversed. |
| State v. Wilde | July 25, 2002 | 02-0126-CR | Unconstitutionally Vague Ordinance - D appealed judgment of circuit court finding guilt of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and argued that his motion to suppress evidence should have been granted because the ordinance under which he was stopped is unconstitutionally vague. The court concluded circumstances are set out with sufficient specificity. The ordinance in question informs a reasonable person that producing noise from squealing tires, acceleration, or a loud muffler in an unreasonable manner, not required by the conditions, is prohibited. Therefore, the ordinance does not fail for vagueness. Judgment affirmed. |
| State v. Timm | July 24, 2002 | 02-0162-CR | Suppression of Evidence - D appealed from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) and contended that trial court erroneously denied motion to suppress because arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to detain D. D's "eyelids were heavy His eyes were very glassy and his speech was slow and deliberate." The court concluded that the trial court erred in ruling that police had reasonable suspicion to stop D's vehicle. The court reversed judgment and remanded for consistent proceedings. |
| State v. Carson | July 24, 2002 | 01-2667-CR | Suppression of Evidence - D appealed from conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) and on appeal, challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress on three grounds: (1) he was improperly denied an alternate test; (2) the testimony of a defense witness should have been allowed under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule; and (3) the evidence of the blood test results should not have been admitted because the "chain of custody" of the blood vials was inadequate. The court rejected D's arguments and affirmed the judgment. |
| State v. Cleaves | July 24, 2002 | 02-0487-CR | Jury Instruction - D argued the trial court erred in modifying the standard jury instruction regarding the definition of operating a motor vehicle. The court concluded that the instruction properly reflected the applicable law and the facts of this case. It therefore affirmed the judgment of conviction. |
| State v. Oimoen | July 18, 2002 | 02-0048 | Suppression of Evidence - D appealed from conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicantand raises two issues: (1)that the warrantless blood draw was unconstitutional because the police could have obtained evidence through a less-invasive breath test; and (2)even if the blood draw was lawful, police required a warrant to analyze the blood because no exigent circumstances existed after the blood was seized. Judgment affirmed, conviction upheld. |
| State v. Halverson | July 11, 2002 | 02-0783-CR | Suppression of Evidence - D appealed conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OMVWI), third offense and contends that the circuit court erred in denying motion to suppress. The court concludes that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that D violated the law and that the scope of the seizure was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the circuit court's order denying the motion to suppress and the judgment of conviction. |
| State v. Krajewski | July 10, 2002 | 99-3165-CR | Blood v. Breath Test - When the person refuses to submit to a requested blood test under the implied consent statute but offers to submit to a breath test in lieu of a blood test, may the state require a warrantless blood draw for alcohol concentration testing. The court held that warrantless nonconsensual blood draw from a person arrested on probable cause for a drunk driving offense is constitutional based on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, even if the person offers to submit to a chemical test other than the blood test chosen by law enforcement, provided that the blood draw complies with the factors enumerated in Bohling. The court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. |
| State v. Williams | July 9, 2002 | 01-0463-CR | Suppression of Evidence - D was stopped for speeding. Trooper conducting the stop issued a warning citation and returned D's driver's license and other paperwork, said "[we]'ll let you get on your way then," shook hands, and headed back to his squad car. After two steps, trooper abruptly turned around and began questioning D about whether he had any guns, knives, drugs, or large amounts of money in the car, and asked for permission to search. D denied having any of the items in question, and gave consent to search. Trooper found heroin and a gun. The state appealed the trial court suppression of items after the stop had concluded and the court of appeals affirmed. The court accepted review and reversed. |
| State v. Pawelek | July 3, 2002 | 01-2285 | Suppression of Evidence - D contended circuit court erred in denying motion to suppress while finding D operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Taken together, an illegal u-turn, late hour, mild odor of alcohol, and D's questionable assertion regarding the cause of the odor were enough to support a reasonable suspicion that D was driving under the influence. D failed all three sobriety tests. Judgement of the circuit court affirmed. |
| State v. Balliette | July 3, 2002 | 01-2527-CR | Ineffective Assistence of Counsel - D was convicted after a jury trial of homicide by the intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that he or she was prejudiced by the deficient performance. D did not sufficiently show prejudice. To prove prejudice, a defendant must show that counsel's errors were so serious that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial and a reliable outcome. Judgment and order affirmed. |
| Winnebago v. Burns | July 3, 2002 | 01-3223 | Probable Cause - Wis. Stat. § 968.24, states that a police officer may stop a person for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably suspects that a person is committing or has committed a crime. If reasonable suspicion exists, the officer may temporarily detain the suspect in order to freeze the situation while further investigation is conducted. Officer determined D was the operator of the motorcycle that was involved in the accident and also that D was "very intoxicated." This information would lead a reasonable officer to reasonably suspect that D had operated the motorcycle in an intoxicated condition. Based upon the record, the court concluded that the officer properly detained D pursuant to Terry and Wis. Stat. §968.24. |
| State v. Estes | July 3, 2002 | 02-0458-CR | Sequester and Evidence - D challenged the trial court's refusal to sequester arresting officer during jury trial. The court determined that trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in authorizing the officer to assist the prosecutor during the trial. D's second challenge was the sufficiency of the evidence that he operated car on a public highway while intoxicated. The court concluded that trial court properly denied D's sequestration motion because arresting deputy was essential to presentation of State's case. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence and reasonable inference to support jury's determination, D operated a vehicle on a public highway. |
| State v. Riddle | July 3, 2002 | 02-0483-CR | Reasonable Suspicion - D argued that a ten-second pause before proceeding at a traffic signal after light turns green does not constitute reasonable suspicion. As long as there is proper legal basis to justify the stop, an officer's subjective motivation does not require dismissal. So long as there are objective facts that would have supported a correct legal theory to be applied and as long as there existed articulable facts fitting the traffic law violation, the search or seizure is legal. Judgment and order affirmed. |
| State v. Holstein | July 2, 2002 | 02-0467-CR | Reasonable suspicion - D argued that the trial court erroneously denied suppression motion by concluding that arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of vehicle. D argued that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion because he did not see D's vehicle being driven in the aggravated erratic manner that an "anonymous" informant described observing. D called informant's reliability into question. The court concluded that the record was replete with evidence demonstrating both the informant's and information's reliability and reasonable suspicion that D was operating while under the influence of an intoxicant. The trial court's order denying D's motion to suppress and the judgment of conviction are affirmed. |
| Little Chute v. Walitalo | July 2, 2002 | 01-3060 | Coercion - D argued that consent to submit to blood test was coerced. D contended that threatened sanction of loss of driving privileges constitutes a coercive measure that invalidates consent for Fourth Amendment purposes. Under Wis. Stat. §343.305, drivers in Wisconsin are deemed to have consented. Had D refused to submit to a blood test, he would have been subject to the penalties under Wis. Stat. §343.305(10). Because there was no actual coercion or improper police conduct, the court concluded that D's consent was voluntary. Judgment affirmed. |
| Case Name | Date | Docket Number | Issue |
|---|---|---|---|
| New London v. Knaus | June 27, 2002 | 02-0052 | Suppression of Evidence - D admitted drinking and performed poorly on field sobriety tests. After the arrest, D was taken to a hospital for a blood draw. The sample was later tested and showed a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.198. The court concluded that because D stipulated to the admissibility of the result of blood-alcohol test at jury trial, right to challenge the City of New London's compliance with procedures set forth in the implied consent statute was waived. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction. |
| State v. Jorgensen | June 27, 2002 | 01-2690-CR | Ineffective Assistence of Counsel, Due Process, Equal Protection, Sentencing - D appealed a judgment of the circuit court finding guilt of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, fourth offense. D also appealed an order denying motion for postconviction relief. The case presents two issues: whether D received ineffective assistance of counsel and whether the sentencing judge violated D's due process and equal protection rights by using a circuit court judicial district sentencing guideline when imposing sentence. Failure to supress statement was not prejudicial. The circuit court's reliance on the sentencing guidelines was appropriate and affirmed. Judgment and order affirmed. |
| State v. Henrickson | June 27, 2002 | 02-0062-CR | Fourth A Challenge - D contended the draw of blood was unconstitutionally unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because breath test was available. The court was bound by Thorstad and concluded drawing D's blood did not violate the Fourth Amendment. D's second contention was that the testing of blood for alcohol is a separate search, and is a warrantless search that is not justified by exigent circumstances and was without consent. The court concluded that this second issue was resolved by reading Thorstad and VanLaarhoven together. Thorstad holds that the seizure of blood in circumstances such as existed in thecase is permitted under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. VanLaarhoven holds that the analysis of legally seized blood is not a separate search for Fourth Amendment purposes, and since D's blood was legally seized, analysis of D's blood was lawful whether consented or not. |
| State v. Grawey | June 27, 2002 | 02-0272-CR | Fourth A Challenge - The issue on appeal is whether D's refusal of a blood draw was reasonable under State v. Bohling. The court held D's refusal was not reasonable. D told officers she was afraid of needles because of a prior bad experience, but did not offer to take an alternative test. We conclude that an officer, acting reasonably, could decide that D's objection was therefore not reasonable. Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit introduction of the evidence of D's refusal. Judgement and order was affirmed. |
| State v. Kovars | June 27, 2002 | 01-3388-CR | Suppression of Evidence - D moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of traffic stop, arguing that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the investigatory stop. The court concluded that reasonable suspicion supported the traffic stop. Therefore, the circuit court correctly denied the motion to suppress. |
| State v. Seaman | June 19, 2002 | 01-3158-CR | Reasonable suspicion - D maintained that arresting officer did not have a reasonable and articulable basis for initiating an investigative stop. D's driving could have an innocent explanation, the court affirmed the circuit court given that a reasonable inference of unlawful conduct could be objectively discerned and an investigative stop was the only option available to resolve the ambiguity in D's driving. Where the evidence supports two competing inferences, the circuit court and the appellate court are entitled to rely upon the inference supporting a reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop. |
| State v. Marshall | June 18, 2002 | 01-3494-CR | Suppression of Evidence - D appealed from the judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant-third offense, following a jury trial. Seeking a new trial, D contended that "[t]he blood test results should have been suppressed following the State's failure to turn over the underlying data from the blood analysis." D argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the evidence of his blood test results. The State, while providing the summary report of the lab analysis of Marshall's blood, failed to provide the underlying reports on which the summary was based. D suffered no prejudice. The court concluded that D failed to establish the trial court erroneously exercised discretion in limiting the exclusion of evidence to the underlying reports. The court affirmed. |
| Sheboygan v. Taylor | June 12, 2002 | 01-3500 | Insanity Defense - D requested that the court make law allowing an insanity defense for traffic forfeiture actions. It is beyond the court's powers as an error-correcting court to do so. That function is normally reserved for the supreme court. D also argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he was driving while intoxicated. The court disagreed and affirmed the conviction and order denying D's postconviction motion to reopen. |
| State v. Long and Curtin | June 11, 2002 | 01-3131 | Seizure - D appealed from circuit court order for judgment of forfeiture divesting all rights, title, and interest in vehicle to the State of Wisconsin. D argued that the court erred in denying motion to dismiss the forfeiture action. D has never challenged the effectuation of the legal premise successfully presented prior. The court concluded, D failed to present any basis on which to reverse the circuit court's order for judgment of forfeiture. The court affirmed. |
| State v. Peterson | June 11, 2002 | 02-0432-CR | Miranda Warning - D appealed from judgment convicting him of fourth offense operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. D's appeal was based on the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress statements he made to a police officer who had stopped to aid him at an accident scene. D contended that he was in custody and should have been advised of his Miranda rights prior to any questioning. Because D was not in custody at the time of questioning, the judgment was affirmed. |
| State v. Kidd | June 6, 2002 | 02-0533-CR | Right to Counsel - D appealed from conviction of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol content. D had three prior convictions, D was subject to more severe penalties under Wis. Stat. §346.65(2)(d) than for his first, second or third convictions. The trial court denied D's motion to invalidate two of his prior convictions, and sentenced him as a fourth offender. The court concluded that D made a prima facie showing that two prior convictions were obtained without an adequate inquiry into whether D's waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing. |
| State v. Zuerner | June 6, 2002 | 01-2337-CR | Supression of Evidence - D appealed judgment convicting him of OMVWI as third offense. D claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of the results of a test of his blood for alcohol concentration. The court rejected D's contentions and affirmed the judgment insofar as it convicts D of OMVWI. D also sought to be re-sentenced as a second-time OMVWI offender instead of a third-time offender. D claimed that one prior OMVWI convictions may not be used to enhance his present penalty because the conviction was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. A prima facie showing that his prior criminal OMVWI conviction may be invalid for penalty enhancement purposes, and the court remanded for a new sentencing hearing. |
| State v. Workman | June 4, 2002 | 02-0188-CR | Suppression of Evidence - D appealed judgment conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. D argued that the circuit court erred by denying suppression motion. According to D, the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him. We disagree and affirm the conviction. |
| State v. Michels | June 4, 2002 | 01-3282 | Seizure - D appealed from trial court's order forfeiting rights to automobile and transferring title to the State. D contends: (1) violation the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment, because the vehicle seized by the State was not the vehicle used in the related OWI violation; and (2) Section 346.65(6), violates Article I, §12 of the WI Constitution by allowing forfeiture of estate. The court concludes that §346.65(6) was unconstitutionally applied to D because it permitted the seizure of a vehicle that was not used to commit the related OWI offense. Accordingly, the court reverses and remands the matter with directions. |
| State v. Sexton | June 4, 2002 | 02-0286-CR | Priors - D appealed judgment of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration. D argued the trial court erred by not exercising its discretion when it ruled that D's sixteen prior convictions were admissible for impeachment purposes. The court concluded that the trial court erred when it failed to apply the appropriate factors. The court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. |
| State v. Senn | May 29, 2002 | 01-3276-CR | Jury instruction - D appealed from a judgment after jury trial convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant; operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration; and failure to yield the right-of-way. D contended that trial court erred by: (1) denying motion to adjourn jury trial; (2)admitting D's statements when responding to a request for a blood test; and (3) concluding that instructing the jury to disregard a witness's answer to a question cured the objectionable nature of the testimony. D also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions for OWI and failure to yield the right-of-way. The court rejected D's contentions and affirmed the judgment. |
| Fond du Lac v. Derksen | May 29, 2002 | 01-2870 | Rights to the Road - The Court puts to rest the notion held that one has an absolute and unfettered right, free of government regulation, to operate a motor vehicle on the roadways of the state. This so-called "right" is rather a privilege that is subject to reasonable regulation by the legislature or other political subdivisions of the state. |
| State v. Storlie | May 29, 2002 | 01-3376-CR | Reimbursement of Expenses - D was convicted of fleeing a police officer and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, fifth offense. D challenges that which requires reimbursing police expenses incurred in replacing "stop sticks" used to halt his vehicle during the commission of the offenses. The court concluded that restitution allowed under Wis. Stat. §973.20 does not include reimbursement for collateral expenses incurred in the normal course of law enforcement. Therefore, the restitution order was reversed. |
| State v. Frey | May 23, 2002 | 01-2995-CR | Motion to Suppress- D contended Fourth Amendment violation on lack of warrant permitting blood to be drawn and tested and available a breath test. D did not contend he would not have plead guilty to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated if evidence was suppressed. Judgment of conviction for violation of Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a), not for violation of PAC, §346.63(1)(b). Therefore, no review of the constitutional issues were necessary. Judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. |
| State v. Albright | May 22, 2002 | 01-2477-CR | Probable Cause- D argued videotape played at motion hearing shows a lack of probable cause to arrest. D crossed centerline twice, failed field and breath sobriety tests. Under totality of circumstances reasonable officer could believe D was intoxicated. Judgment of conviction was affirmed. |
| State v. Bogumill | May 21, 2002 | 01-3141-CR | Constitutional Challenge- D driver's license had been revoked for seven months as a result of an OWI conviction. D also had two prior non-criminal OAR convictions resulting from failure to pay a fine or forfeiture. D challenged the constitutionality of §343.44(2g) because D was treated the same as someone whose two previous OAR convictions were OWI-related. Court determined that D was treated similarly to individuals with two fine-related OAR convictions and a OWI-related OAR charge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. |
| State v. Arias-Cruz | May 15, 2002 | 01-2668-CR | Sentencing- D argued on appeal that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in sentencing and in denying motion for sentence modification. The court sentenced him to consecutive sentences on each count for the maximum possible of eighty-five years in prison. Reliance on prior case mentioned in sentencing and claim of new factor to modify sentence was not substantiated. Judgment of circuit court was affirmed. |
| State v. Lopez | May 9, 2002 | 01-2834-CR | Probable Cause- D appealed from conviction of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense. The court concluded that a reasonable police officer could believe that D was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and therefore probable cause established to arrest. Contention that Swanson, 164 Wis.2d 437, requires a field sobriety test to establish probable cause failed. The Swanson footnote does not mean that under all circumstances the officer must first perform a field sobriety test. The trial court correctly denied motion to suppress. Judgement affirmed. |
| Winnebago County v. Wicklund | May 8, 2002 | 01-0490 | Motion to Suppress- D appealed conviction for OWI in challenging motion to suppress evidence of a blood test arguing it was coerced under Wis. Stat. §343.305. D also contended that County needed to obtain search warrant for blood test. D suggested case held for supreme court opinion in State v. Krajewski, No. 99-3165-CR (Krajewski fears needles and the court examines "the right of police to require blood testing in drunk driving cases when breath testing was practically available.") The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. |
| State v. Baumgartner | May 7, 2002 | 01-2703 & 01-2704 | Dismiss or amend charge- Milwaukee County appealed trial court's dismissal of Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a) and trial court's suasponte amendment of the charge of Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(b), to that of Wis. Stat. §346.62(2).3. The trial court lacked the inherent power to amend or dismiss the charges suasponte. The trial court was reversed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the original charges against the defendant. |
| State v. Bessert | May 1, 2002 | 01-206901-1144 | Motion to Suppress- D challenged the trial court's ruling denying his motion to suppress evidence of a blood test. D contested constitutionality of implied consent law and decision to take a blood test when breath test was available. Thorstad and Bohling are controlling and no relation to Krajewski existed. Decision of the circuit court was affirmed. |
| State v. Konkol | May 1, 2002 | 01-2126-CR | Disclosure of Witness- This was a case of first impression. D raised the issue, but the State does not have to disclose an expert witness it knows and anticipates using in rebuttal regardless of the discovery rule stating that the duty to disclose does not apply to rebuttal witnesses. The trial court reasoned that the State had anticipated the defense theory before trial and had known the expert would be called to testify. Therefore, the trial court incorrectly stated the State had a duty to disclose the witness to prevent unfair surprise and prejudice. Judgment of the circuit court for Winnebago County was affirmed. |
| State v. Arechederra III | April 25, 2002 | 01-0609 | OWI Notice Failure- D appeals an order revoking driving privileges for one year for refusal to submit to a breath test. He was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, contrary to Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a) (1997-98). He refused to submit to a chemical test of his breath, in violation of Wis. Stat. §343.305(2), and was issued a notice of intent to revoke his operating privileges. The trial court determined that the officer's failure to take D's license was a technical error, that the omission of the court name on the notice of intent to revoke form was also a technical error, and that the D suffered no prejudice because of these two errors. The trial court found that D declined to give a breath sample, and that he had the physical capability at the time he refused to submit to the test. The court of appeals affirmed the revoking driving privileges. |
| State v. Roberts | April 24, 2002 | 01-1639-CR | Evidentiary Challenge- D appealed from a judgment of conviction for operating while intoxicated (fifth offense), operating after revocation (fourth offense) and obstructing an officer, all as a repeat offender, and from an order rejecting a challenge to the sentence; under Wis. Stat. §752.35 (1999-2000) because the jury was distracted from the real controversy of whether he was driving the vehicle. The court held that in order to grant a new trial under Wis. Stat. §752.35, the real controversy was not tried. However the court ruled that the real issue was put before the jury. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. |
| Fontana v. Zamecnik | April 24, 2002 | 01-3074-FT | Abuse of Discretion- D filed a motion to reopen this case, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §346.65(2g)(b), alleging a lack of consultation and clear implication of a plea agreement. D then moved under Wis. Stat. §806.07. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in denying D's motion for relief from the OWI judgment. |
| State v. Moen | April 23, 2002 | 01-2676-CR | Exercise of Discretion- D appeals from a judgment of conviction on one count of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, contrary to Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a) (1999-2000). D claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. He also claims the trial court erred when it denied his motions to dismiss and his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Because there was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to convict D, and because the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when ruling on the motions, the appeals court affirmed. |
| State v. Groesbeck | April 16, 2002 | 01-3362-CR | Motion to Suppress- The State appealed an order granting D's motion to suppress evidence. Because the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop D and conduct a further investigation, the appeals court reversed the order. |
| State v. McConnell | April. 3, 2002 | 01-2476-CR | Double Jeopardy - D appealed from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) pursuant to Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a). D argued that the State's simultaneous prosecution of him for both OWI and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) pursuant to §346.63(1)(b) violated his double jeopardy protection and due process rights. The court of appeals held that this appeal was governed by the court's previous opinion in State v. Raddeman, 2000 WI App 190, 238 Wis.2d 628, 618 N.W.2d 258, review denied, 2000 WI 121, 239 Wis.2d 312, 619 N.W.2d 94 (Wis. Oct. 17, 2000) (No. 00-0143-CR). The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. |
| State v. McQueen | Mar. 28, 2002 | 01-2041 | Blood Test, Constitutional Challenge - D appealed the trial court's order revoking his operating privilege because he refused to submit to a chemical test to determine his blood alcohol concentration as required by Wis. Stat. §343.305. He contended the trial court erred in denying, at the conclusion of the refusal hearing, his motion to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that §343.305 is unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed because D failed to notify the attorney general as required by Wis. Stat. §806.04(11). |
| Waushara
County v. Duhm | Mar. 28, 2002 | 01-2900-FT 01-2901-FT 01-2902-FT | Discretion, Underdeveloped Arguments- D appealed the circuit court's denial of his motion to reopen three default judgments related to two traffic violations and a separate citation for underage drinking. He contended the circuit court erred because it applied the wrong legal standard in deciding his motion. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order because the record contained no affidavit or other evidence which set forth a factual basis sufficient to vacate the default judgments under either the standard applied by the circuit court or that which D contended applied. |
| State v. Gruber | Mar. 27, 2002 | 01-2281-CR | Intoxilyzer 5000, Retrial - D sought a new trial to attack the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer 5000. The court of appeals held that such an attack amounted to nothing more than a new theory of defense and did not justify a new trial in the interest of justice. |
| City of Appleton v. Tyrrell | Mar. 26, 2002 | 01-2846 | Chemical Test Refusal, 4th Amendment Challenge - D appealed from an order concluding that he had no basis to refuse to submit to chemical testing of his blood alcohol content after being arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. Prior to the refusal hearing, D sought dismissal of the refusal proceeding, contending that the application of the penalties mandated by Wis. Stat. §343.305 for refusing to submit to chemical testing constituted an infringement on his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court denied that motion and ultimately concluded that D had no basis to refuse to submit to the requested test. |
| State v. Bartlett | Mar. 21, 2002 | 01-1275-CR | Reasonable Suspicion, Self-Identifying Tips - The State of Wisconsin appealed an order of the circuit court granting D's motion to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content based on a lack of reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the decision because it agreed with the State's basic proposition that the arresting police officer had acted properly in stopping D based on information of a possible crime from a caller who provided self-identifying information. |
| State v. Cook | Mar. 21, 2002 | 01-2367-CR | Seizure/Custody, Investigative Stop, Reasonable Suspicion - D appealed a judgment of the circuit court finding him guilty of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense. More specifically, D contended the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, which he alleged was the result of an illegal stop. The court of appeals concluded, In light of the totality of the circumstances, that a reasonable person would not have believed that he was not free to leave when the arresting officer initially contacted D. Thus, it was not necessary that the officer have reasonable suspicion to believe that D had committed or was about to commit a crime before making contact. The court of appeals thus concluded that the circuit court properly denied D's motion to suppress and, accordingly, it affirm the judgment of conviction. |
| State v. Mueller | Mar. 21, 2002 | 01-1954 | Seizure/Custody/Arrest: Movement of Suspect During a Temporary Investigation for Safety Reasons - The State of Wisconsin appealed an order of the circuit court granting D's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a consequence of the stop, detention, and arrest of D on January 19, 2001. The court of appeals held that the mere move of D from a public street to nearby Chadbourne Residence Hall did not, by itself, convert what was otherwise a permissible detention into an impermissible arrest. Under the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable person in D's position would have believed he was in custody, simply because he was moved from the cold outdoors to the interior of a nearby student residence hall to perform field sobriety tests. Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's order granting D's motion to suppress and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. |
| State v. Kossow | Mar. 20, 2002 | 01-2545-CR | Reasonable Suspicion - D appealed from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration, second offense. D argued that the deputy sheriff's unparticularized suspicion was insufficient to justify a traffic stop. The court of appeals disagreed with this contention and affirmed the judgment of conviction. |
| State v. McAnulty | Mar. 19, 2002 | 01-2573-CR | Reasonable Suspicion - D appealed from his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, second offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a). D argued that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle and therefore any evidence following the stop should have been suppressed. The court of appeals rejected his argument and affirmed the conviction. |
| State v. Salm | Mar. 13, 2002 | 01-2443-FT | Arrest Prerequisite to Implied Consent - D appealed from an order revoking her driver's license for one year after the trial court found that her refusal to submit to chemical testing was unreasonable. D argued that because she was never placed under arrest, the prerequisites of the implied consent law were not satisfied and she could not be deemed to have unlawfully refused an implied consent test. The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that D was under arrest at the time the officer asked her to submit to chemical testing. |
| State v. Laufer | Mar. 7, 2002 | 01-1493-CR | Collateral Attack of Prior Convictions, Waiver of Right to Counsel - D appealed a judgment convicting him of fifth-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI). The issue was whether the trial court properly denied his collateral challenge to a prior OWI conviction used to enhance the charge. Specifically, D argued that a 1994 conviction should not count against him because he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his right to counsel in that proceeding. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. |
| State v. Young | Mar. 6, 2002 | 01-2542 | Probable Cause, Field Sobriety Tests, NHTSA Requirements - D appealed from an order revoking his driving privileges for one year. D contended that the arresting officer failed to comply with the standardized field sobriety testing requirements established in the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) training manual; therefore, the officer did not have probable cause to request D to submit to an evidentiary test of his blood. The court of appeals concluded that there was no legal authority in Wisconsin that stood for the proposition that only the field sobriety tests approved by the NHTSA must be given or that the results must match the results described in the NHTSA manual before an arresting officer has sufficient probable cause to request a driver to submit to a chemical test of his or her blood. |
| City of Baraboo v. Ranum | Feb. 28, 2002 | 01-1492 | Exercise of Discretion, Assistance of Counsel - D appealed a judgment of conviction for driving while under the influence of an intoxicant, first offense. He contended the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying his request for a continuance of the trial so that he could obtain counsel. The court of appeals concluded the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion and therefore affirmed. |
| Columbia County v. Kloostra | Feb. 28, 2002 | 01-1319 | Blood Test, Implied Consent, Coercion - D appealed a judgment convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OMVWI) in violation of a Columbia County ordinance. He claimed the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of the results of a test of his blood for alcohol concentration. Specifically, D argued that the County should have obtained a warrant prior to analyzing the blood sample it withdrew from him, and that because his consent to the testing of his blood was "coerced," it cannot be relied on as an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The court of appeals rejected both contentions and affirmed the appealed judgment. |
| Jefferson County v. Marcelle | Feb. 28, 2002 | 01-1516 | Blood Test, Implied Consent - D appealed a judgment of the circuit court finding him guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration. D contended the court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content. The court of appeals affirmed. |
| State v. Meiers | Feb. 28, 2002 | 01-1792 | Refusal to Submit to a Chemical Test - D appealed from an order of the circuit court finding that D's refusal to submit to a chemical testing of his breath, requested pursuant to Wis. Stat. §343.305, was unreasonable. The trial court revoked D's operating privilege for one year. The court of appeals affirmed. |
| Barron County v. Buchner | Feb. 27, 2002 | 01-2933-FT | Probable Cause - D appealed from an order denying her motion to suppress and a judgment convicting her of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, contrary to Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a), and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration, contrary to § 346.63(1)(b). D claimed the arresting officer lacked probable cause to administer a preliminary breath test (PBT), and hence lacked probable cause to arrest her. As a result, she argued that the trial court erred by denying her suppression motion. The court of appeals concluded that the officer had probable cause to administer the PBT and, therefore, affirmed the conviction and the order denying D's suppression motion. |
| State v. Hanson | Feb. 27, 2002 | 01-2069-CR | Implied Consent - D appealed from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) as a repeat offender pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§346.63(1)(a) and 345.55(2)(b). D challenged the trial court's ruling denying her motion to suppress evidence of a blood test. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment. |
| State v. Skenandore | Feb. 27, 2002 | 01-2561-CR | Probable
Cause - D appealed from a judgment of
conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), third offense, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§346.63(1)(a) and 346.65(2)(c). On appeal, D argued that the trial court erred in denying a pretrial motion to suppress the results of a blood test performed on him following his arrest. The motion alleged that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest D for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and therefore the draw of D blood was illegal. The court of appeals concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances, that probable cause existed to support an arrest, and the trial court properly denied D's motion to suppress the results of the blood test. The court of appeals therefore affirmed the judgment. |
| State v. Ingalls | Feb. 20, 2002 | 01-1060 | Blood Test Refusal - D appealed an order revoking her driving privileges for one year. She argued that the trial court erroneously determined that her refusal to submit to a blood test was unreasonable. She further contended that her refusal was justified because she requested an alternative test. Because the record supports the court's findings, the court of appeals affirmed the order. |
| State v. Sefton | Feb. 20, 2002 | 01-2718-CR | Reasonable
Suspicion - D pled no contest to operating a motor vehicle with a
prohibited blood alcohol concentration, contrary to Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(b). He appealed his conviction, contending that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. D claimed that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion to justify his request to another officer to stop D. The court of appeals concluded that the officer had sufficient cause to request the stop and therefore affirmed the trial court's order denying D's motion to suppress and the judgment of conviction. |
| State v. Telele | Feb. 19, 2002 | 01-2459 | Motion to Sequester Arresting Officer - D appealed from a judgment, following a jury trial, convicting her of driving a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration of 0.1% or more. She argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion to sequester the arresting officer during the jury trial and, as a result, that she was denied a fair trial. The court of appeals disagreed and, therefore, affirmed. |
| State v. Beaver | Feb. 14, 2002 | 01-1796-CR | Implied
Consent - D appealed from a
judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated-second offense, and from an order denying his motion to
suppress the results of his blood test. D contended that analysis of a
legally seized blood draw is a separate search requiring a warrant. D also
challenges the constitutionality of Wisconsin's Implied Consent Law, Wis. Stat. §343.305. Under State v. VanLaarhoven, 2001 WI App 275, ___Wis.2d ___, 637 N.W.2d 411, the State was not required to obtain a warrant to lawfully analyze D's blood. Because the State was authorized to analyze D's blood with or without his consent, the court of appeals did not address the constitutionality of the Implied Consent Law. Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed. |
| State v. Lawrence | Feb. 14, 2002 | 01-0220-CR | Guilty
Plea - D appealed from
an order denying his postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. D pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated,
his seventh conviction of this offense. D argued that his plea was not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The court of appeals
reversed the order denying postconviction relief and remanded for further proceedings. |
| State v. Williams | Feb. 14, 2002 | 01-1726-CR | Probable Cause - D was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration, both as second offenses. She moved to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol test administered after her arrest, arguing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest. The circuit court denied the motion and D pled no contest. Because the court of appeals concluded that the police officer had probable cause to arrest D, it affirmed the judgment and the order of the circuit court. |
| State v. Earley | Feb. 13, 2002 | 01-0422-CR | No
Contest Plea - D appealed from a
judgment convicting him of causing great bodily injury by the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of Wis. Stat. §940.25(1)(a) (1999-2000). He also appealed from an order denying his motion to withdraw his no contest plea. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment and order. |
| State v. Thayer | Feb. 12, 2002 | 01-2528-CR | Informing the Accused Form, Implied Consent - D appealed a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), second offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a). D argued that the blood test results should have been suppressed because the Informing the Accused form was misleading by implying she had a right to refuse a blood test. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the conviction. |
| State v. Clairmore | Feb. 5, 2002 | 01-1428-CR | Reasonable Suspicion, Probable Cause - D appealed from a judgment convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, (OWI), second offense, in violation of Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a), and an order denying his motion to suppress. D contended that the arresting officer lacked both reasonable suspicion to initially stop him and probable cause to arrest him for OWI. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment and order. |
| State v. Marshall | Feb. 5, 2002 | 01-1403-CR | Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Modification of Sentence - D appealed from a judgment entered after he pled guilty to one count of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) (fifth offense), contrary to Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a) (1999-2000). D also appealed from the trial court's order denying his postconviction motion. D claimed that: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the blood alcohol evidence, which he alleged was obtained in violation of Wis. Stat. §343.305(9)(a); and (2) two "new factors" established grounds for modification of his sentence. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed. Rec. for Publication |
| State v. Pigman | Feb. 5, 2002 | 01-2395-CR | Informing the Accused Form, Implied Consent, Due Process - D appealed from a judgment convicting him after a bench trial for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), second offense, in violation of Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a). He contended that the Informing the Accused form read to him after he was arrested for OWI was misleading because it failed to tell him that he has no right to refuse an evidentiary test for his blood alcohol content and therefore violates the Due Process Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. |
| Village of Oregon v. Sunday | Jan. 31, 2002 | 01-2192-FT | Reasonable Suspicion, No Contest Plea - D appealed a judgment convicting her of first-offense operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC). She claimed that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle. The court of appeals concluded, however, that D forfeited her opportunity to appeal the denial of her suppression motion when she entered a plea of no contest to the charge of violating the Village of Oregon's traffic ordinance. Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment. |
| State v. Dasko | Jan. 30, 2002 | 01-2320-CR | Harmless Error, Jury Selection, Bias - D appealed from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), third offense, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§346.63(1)(a) and 346.65(2)(c). D was found guilty of the charge following a requested jury trial. D's appeal raised two issues: (1) the trial court erred when it denied her motion to strike a prospective juror for cause based on subjective bias; and (2) as a result of this denial, D sought the remedy of a new trial because she was forced to use one of her four peremptory challenges to remove this juror, thereby depriving her of the full benefit of her peremptory challenges. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred in not removing the juror for cause based on subjective bias; however, D was not deprived of any rights under Wisconsin law and therefore was not entitled to a new trial. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment. |
| State v. Denure | Jan. 24, 2002 | 01-1102-CR | Probable Cause - D appealed from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration. D argued that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained after a subpoena was issued under Wis. Stat. §968.135. He contended that probable cause did not support the subpoena. The court of appeals agreed and therefore reversed. |
| State v. Elmer | Jan. 24, 2002 | 01-1125-CR | Exercise of Discretion, Burden of Proof- D appealed a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found her guilty of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license. At trial, D attempted to show that she had not operated the vehicle and that, instead, she had switched seats with the intoxicated driver after police had stopped them. Her primary contention was that the circuit court committed reversible error by restricting the testimony of the other occupant of the vehicle. The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it limited relevant testimony which was not unfairly prejudicial to the prosecution. Also, the State had not carried its burden to show that the circuit court's evidentiary error was harmless. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial. |
| State v. Delaney | Jan. 23, 2002 | 01-1051-CR | Miranda, Penalty Enhancer - D appealed from a judgment of conviction and sentence for operating while intoxicated (OWI), third offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§346.63(1)(a) and 346.65(2)(c). D first argued that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress a statement of confession given to the police prior to receiving a Miranda warning. D contended that his statement that he was the driver of a car involved in a hit-and-run accident was obtained during a custodial interrogation and should have been suppressed. D additionally challenged the trial court's application of the penalty enhancement statute, Wis. Stat. §939.62, as he was already subject to the penalty enhancers for multiple offenses pursuant to Wis. Stat. §346.65(2)(c). The court of appeals rejected both of D's arguments and affirmed the judgment of conviction. |
| State v. Chapman | Jan. 16, 2002 | 01-2283-CR | Reasonable Suspicion - D appealed his conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, third offense. He argued that his motion to suppress the evidence of intoxication should have been granted because he was seized without reasonable suspicion. The court of appeals rejected the argument and affirmed. |
| State v. Marshalek | Jan. 16, 2002 | 01-1982-CR | Reasonable Suspicion - The State appealed the trial court's order granting D's motion to suppress the results of a traffic stop and dismiss the offenses against him. The State argued that based upon the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and temporarily detain D. The court of appeals affirmed the order of the trial court. |
| State v. Ringler | Jan. 9, 2002 | 01-1359 | Reasonable Suspicion - D appealed from an order revoking her operating privilege based upon her improper refusal to submit to a chemical test following her arrest for operating while intoxicated (OWI). D contended that the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the revocation order. |